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Veterinary Malpractice
Leading the Evolution of Animal Law
Barbara J. Gislason
terinary malpractice is arguably the most rapidly evolving area in animal law and is
idered by many to be the fulcrum for what will happen elsewhere. As in most areas
animal law, a dearth of state and federal statutes presently address veterinary malprac-
tice. As societal values change, however, and animals increasingly are treated as family
members, the courts must follow old common law, find good faith reasons to modify it,
or wait for legislative enactments. Consequently, veterinary malpractice is attracting the
attention of practicing attorneys. It is the subject of intense interest from professors and
scholars, as reflected in challenging articles by Richard L. Cupp & Amber E. Dean, Vets in
the Doghouse: Are Pet Suits Economically Viable? 31 THE BRiEF, Spring 2002, at 42;
Christopher Green, The Future of Veterinary Malpractice Liability in the Care of Companion
Animals, 10 ANIMAL L. 163 (2004); and Rebecca J. Huss, Valuation in Veterinary
Malpractice, 35 Loy. U. CHi. L.J. 479 (2004).
The only two models that permeate discussions about veterinary malpractice are based
upon strained definitions of property (e.g., animate, constitutive, sentimental, sentient) or
personhood (like a ship or corporation), yet animals,as logic would dictate-are neither
property nor persons. Can talented legal minds bring all interests to the table and devel-
op model statutory definitions for the word animals, beginning in the veterinary mal-
practice context? What would this change in nomenclature mean, in practical terms? Are
continued on page 6
he expanding concern about harm to pets presents a unique challenge to law that gov-
ens an appropriate level of damages to an individual harmed by the wrongful conduct of
another. Throughout legal history domestic animals have been considered property, and
most existed with humans in the context of agricultural provision of food and fiber. Within
this culture, an animals value was almost entirely economic. At the same time, a legal sys-
tems focus for reimbursement was limited strictly to economic harm. If you killed or
harmed a cow, damages were the market value for the cow If the cow was injured to the
degree that the cost of veterinary care and recovery would exceed the animals market
value, the animal most often was "put down": killed. Then as now, it made little econom-
ic sense to invest more to repair than replace a piece of property.
gcontinued on page 4
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Issues of harm and damages to many animals have not
changed much from how they were resolved 100 years ago.
But the issue of harm to pets has prompted reconsideration of
old limitations. Pets have replaced farm animals as the primna-
ry source of animal-human interaction. Pet ownership now is
widespread, with more than 100 million dogs and cats resid-
ing in U.S. homes. Some humans undoubtedly have had spe-
cial relationships with domestic animals ever since they were
brought into human households, but it is just in the past
decade that the world of science has confirmed the real,
noneconomic value of pets as companions. (General discus-
sions of this issue are available at wwwanimallawinfo/top-
ics/spuspetdamages.htm.)
For most people the relationship between a human and
a pet is not based on economic considerations. Indeed, like
children, pets cost money that can never be expected to be
recovered. Although some pets win awards and command
high-dollar breeding and offspnng fees, the vast majority
of pets are just members of the family. The bond between
humans and pets is not imaginary and can contribute sig-
nificantly to individual well-being. One objective measure
of a pet's value to a person is the amount of money an
owner is willing to spend for veterinary care. A cat with little or no market value may
require surgery that can cost hundreds or thousands of dollars, and many owners are
willing to pay such amounts.
Before damages for a person's pain and suffering for loss of or injury to a pet are
allowed, a number of difficult questions must to be resolved. Although many humans
do seriously believe that a pet is a family member, the law has not gone quite this far.
A pet is still property-living, special property, but property nonetheless. But pets give
rise to a number of public policy questions: How can the system evaluate whether an
individual suffered emotional trauma from injury to or death of a pet-particularly if
the person was not present during the incident? How do we measure the degree of
loss? How do we handle the risk of turning this emotional issue over to a jury that
may see tears on one side and deep insurance pockets on the other?
The Cases
In 1981 the Supreme Court of Hawaii, in Campbell v. Animal Quarantine Station,
632 P2d 1066 (Haw. 1981), set a precedent for a new interpretation in "pet law" by
upholding an award for mental distress to five members of a family whose dog was
killed while being transported to a private hospital by a state agency The dog had been
kept in an unventilated van in the hot sun and died of heat prostration after arriving
at the hospital. The court upheld the $1,000 award even though family members had
not watched the animal die or seen its body; they learned of its death in a phone call,
and no member found it necessary to seek psychiatric or medical assistance. Public
policy discussion was not really present in the case. It seems the court was unaware of
the sweeping changes its opinion represented.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court in Rabideau v. City of Racine, 627 N.W2d 795 (Wis.
2001), was faced with this fact pattern: a woman watched as a neighbor police officer
shot and killed her dog. Although the court recognized the bond between owner and
pet, it said that public policy prevented recovery based upon either negligent inflic-
tion of emotional distress to a bystander or negligent damage to her property The
court noted that under certain circumstances a person could recover for intentional
infliction of emotional distress for harm to a pet, but it also stated:
We are particularly concerned that were such a claim to go forward, the law would
proceed upon a course that had no just stopping point. Humans have an enormous
capacity to form bonds with dogs, cats, birds and an infinite number of other
beings that are non-human. Were we to recognize a claim for damages for the neg-
ligent loss of a dog, we can find little basis for rationally distinguishing other cate-
gories of animal companion.
In Pickford v. Masion, 98 P3d 1232 (Wash. 2004), the plaintiff's dog was mauled by
the defendants' dogs and sustained permanent injuries. The trial court granted sum-
mary judgment against the plaintiff's claims of negligent and malicious infliction of
emotional distress. The court of appeals affirmed the grant of partial summary judg-
ment and further held that the destruction of the companion relationship could not
be extended to dogs: "Such an extension of duty and liability is more appropriately
made by the legislature."
Continuing Need for Change
Even though the courts have shown a reluctance to make new law regarding this issue,
it will not go away anytime soon. The emotional harm is real, and actions against animals
are often too egregious to be ignored; it seems unfair that the risk to a wrongdoer is limit-
ed simply to the market value of a harmed pet. Although
recovery for human pain and suffering is all well and
good, it does not address the real harm, the harm to the
animal. The best response of the legal system to a wrong-
doer who harms an animal should be on behalf of the
animal harmed, directly, by allowing the animal to
recover for that harm and be made whole again. At the
very least, a wrongdoer should be liable for all reason-
able veterinary costs necessary for the animal to recover
from the inflicted injury or harm.
Given that the courts currently represent a dead end
for damages resolution, the obvious alternative is the
legislature. Indeed, legislative change has begun.
Kentucky, Connecticut, and Illinois have adopted laws
allowing pet owners limited windows of opportunity to
recover for losses arising out of harm to a pet. Maryland
does not allow collection for pain and suffering but clar-
ifies that actual damage in excess of market value for the
pet may be charged, up to $5,000 for veterinarian care.
MD. CODE ANN. CTS. &JuD. PROC. § 11-110 (2002).
By the end of this decade, a significant number of
states likely will have adopted laws that make some provision for enhancement of dam-
ages, beyond mere market value, for intentional and negligent harm to pets. 10,
David Favre is a professor of animal law at Michigan State University College of Law and a vice
chair of the TIPS Animal Law Committee. During the past 20 years, he has published a number
of books and law review articles dealing with a wide assortment of animal topics. He can be
reached atfavre@law.msu.edu.
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If I leave a firm to start my own practice, do I need to purchase full "prior
acts" coverage, or should I rely on "former lawyer" coverage on the old firm's
policy? Consider whether you want to rely on the continued existence of the for-
mer firm-and on its continuing to insure with a carier that provides coverage
for former attorneys.
Financial Considerations
What limits of liability should I carry? One of the best ways to determine this
limit is to review the files in your office both open files and recently closed files.
Determine the maximum value of the file, i.e., if the work is transactional, determine
the amount of the transaction and add items such as potential interest. If the case is
a personal injury matter, evaluate the maximum damages. Remember to consider the
number of lawyers in the firm because all of these lawyers share the limits on the pol-
icy. Keep in mind that you will also have an "aggregate limit" of coverage, which is the
maximum amount available to pay all claims that arise within that policy year. One
claim could exhaust not only your per-claim limit but also your aggregate limit for
that policy year, leaving you at risk for personal exposure should another claims arise
during the same policy year.
How do I determine an appropriate deductible figure? Decide what you can
afford to pay in the event a claim is made against you. The difference in premium for
a lower deductible generally is not significant. Remember that even a frivolous claim
can generate defense costs. Also inquire about a "loss only" deductible, which will
apply only if your defense is unsuccessful and a payment is made to the claimant.
What is the definition of "defense within limits"? This term means that
amounts spent on defense will decrease the indemnity limits. Therefore it is impor-
tant to consider the defense costs that might be incurred when you are trying to deter-
mine the policy limits for your practice. 4t
Donna D. Lange is an attorney and director of business development at Minnesota Lawyers
Mutual. She can be reached at dlange@mlmins.com.
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